Does universalization ethics justify participation in large elections?
Bonus content
- Overview
- Consistent Strategies
- Benefit Functions
With Ingela Alger and Jean-François Laslier
Paper: TSE working paper (2026)
Abstract:Why would voters incur costs to cast votes they believe are inconsequential? We show that a form of universalization ethics can help explain this "paradox of costly voting." The political model has two candidates, a continuum of voters, a known underdog, and two novel elements: core voters (who always vote), and distinct election stakes for the partisan groups. Elections are modeled as power-sharing institutions, winner-take-all being a limit case. Cost-sensitive voters, whose turnout behavior we analyze, consider the election outcome, should their decision be universalized to other voters. The "others" can be limited to co-partisans ("partisan ethics") or not ("nonpartisan ethics"). In contrast to most of the literature, we do not impose conditions ensuring existence and uniqueness.
The universalization ethics often fosters participation, but coordination problems remain. Equilibrium can fail to exist under partisan ethics, and equilibrium multiplicity can arise under both partisan and nonpartisan ethics. Equilibria where the underdog wins may coexist with equilibria where the topdog wins. The former are sustained because of a boost of cost-sensitive voters' willingness to vote, stemming either from a large core constituency or from a high stake. In this case, the core constituency is a complement rather than a substitute for the cost-sensitive voters.
Presented at:
2024: EEA-ESEM Congress (Rotterdam), ESA European Meeting (Helsinki)
2025: QMUL Economics and Finance PhD workshop (London)
The code for generating the graphics in the paper can be found here:
We provide an interactive plot showing consistent strategies for a wide range of model parameters in our partisan case.
Moreover, we provide an interactive plot that compares our choice of the power-sharing function with the one used by Herrera, Morelli and Nunnari (2016) [1].
References:1. Herrera, H., Morelli, M. and Nunnari, S. (2016), Turnout Across Democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 60: 607-624.https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12215
This work was supported by a French government grant managed by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche under the "Investissements d'avenir" program (reference "ANR-18-EURE-0021").